This paper considers a general class of multi-sender Bayesian persuasion games in which senders move sequentially. All senders have reduced form utility functions over beliefs that are discontinuous at points of indifference for the decision maker, but we can still prove existence of equilibria by showing that it is without loss of generality to consider equilibria over a finite set of beliefs. We also show that for a set of sender payoff functions with Lebesgue measure one the equilibrium is essentially unique in terms of the joint distribution over outcomes and states. Finally, we establish some comparative statics. Adding a sender who makes the first move cannot reduce the informativeness of the equilibrium.
Introduction
It is often taken for granted that competition increases the information revealed. Specifically, second, or more generally, multiple opinions have been advocated as a mechanism to reduce bias when advisors have conflicts of interest. For example, a patient whose doctor recommends a drug might visit another doctor if the primary doctor has a consulting relationship with the company producing the drug in question. Home sellers using a realtor may consult a second realtor to obtain a separate appraisal as the primary real estate agent may have an incentive to price properties low to get faster sales. In fact, businesses specializing in selling second opinion services are common in medicine, finance, marketing, and law (see Sarvary (2002) and the references therein).
In many examples when multiple experts are consulted, the process is sequential in nature.
The provider of the second opinion knows that the initial opinion triggered a second opinion, and often also the exact nature of the initial advice. For example, medical second opinions tend to be (strategically) sequential when triggered by an internal rule or by an insurance provider.
Also, the realtor that is providing a secondary appraisal is at least aware of the existence of another appraisal. More generally, in competition between different news organizations, it is clear that players do respond to information provided by other outlets.
In this paper, we consider a sequential model of information disclosure building on the recent advances in multi-sender Bayesian persuasion games in Kamenica (2016, 2017 ). An uninformed decision maker seeks to maximize her payoff, which, to avoid trivialities, is state dependent. There is also a number of senders that, to make things interesting, are biased from the point of view of the decision maker. 1 Senders move in sequence, each constructing an experiment or signal with a precision ranging from no information to full revelation of the state. Each sender observes the experiments designed by previous senders. Surprisingly, it is irrelevant whether or not they also observe the outcomes of the existing experiments, which is a consequence of assuming that signals can be arbitrarily correlated. We will postpone an exact statement of what this means to the main bulk of the paper, but the crucial implication is that each sender can refine the pre-existing information structure realization by realization.
Senders have infinite action spaces and the reduced form payoff functions over decision maker beliefs are discontinuous at points where the decision maker switches from one action to another. Moreover, nothing in the model guarantees that senders agree on how the decision maker should break ties. Existence of equilibria is therefore an issue, and we are aware of no 1 A sender sharing the preferences with the decision maker could and would in equilibrium fully reveal the state. This cannot be undone by any other sender, so this case is uninteresting. off-the-shelf existence theorem that applies. The reader may notice that the existence question does not arise in the simultaneous move models considered in Kamenica (2016, 2017 ) because full revelation is always an equilibrium in these models. That is, if at least two senders play fully revealing signals, the information structure available for the decision maker is fully revealing regardless of any unilateral deviation by any player. Hence, no player is pivotal, so a fully revealing equilibrium exists even if this would be the worst possible outcome for every sender. In the sequential case on the other hand, all senders understand that they have influence unless a fully revealing signal has already been played. It follows that full revelation is not guaranteed to be an equilibrium, which we view as a desirable property.
Fortunately, we can use the the convexity of the model to prove an existence result. Using linearity in probabilities, the choice rule by the decision maker can be characterized in terms of intersections of upper half spaces, which are convex polytopes. Actions are constant in the interior of each polytope, so it is possible to replicate any outcome with an interior belief in some polytope with one where all probability is assigned to the edges of the polytopes, provided that an appropriate tie breaking rule is used. Hence, the problem for the final sender is equivalent with a problem in which beliefs are restricted to belong to vertices of the polytopes, a finite problem. Existence of a (Markov perfect) equilibrium can then be established by backwards induction, where in each step senders without loss restrict attention to a finite set of beliefs.
Being able to restrict attention to the vertices of decision maker's "optimal action areas" in belief space also allows us to prove a strong generic essential uniqueness result. The reason for the qualifier essential is that it is possible that all players can be indifferent across a continuum of distributions in the interior of a polytope that defines optimal choices for the decision maker, but such multiplicity is irrelevant in the sense that the joint distribution over states and actions is the same for all such equilibria. Hence, we are without loss of generality focusing on equilibria in which beliefs are on the (finite set of) vertices of the decision maker's choice areas. We can then show that for a fixed decision maker payoff function essential uniqueness can fail only for a set of sender payoff profiles of measure zero.
The generic uniqueness result is another consequence of the convexity of the model, combined with the fact that any equilibrium outcome can be replicated by a one step equilibrium. A one step equilibrium is an equilibrium in which the first sender is the only sender that provides any non-trivial information. Because signals can be arbitrarily correlated, every sender can always unilaterally change the information system implied by the previous senders into any Blackwell-more-informative signal. Hence, if we start with an arbitrary equilibrium and change it so that sender 1 plays the joint signal implied by the individual signals by senders 1, ..., n, assume that no sender provides any additional information on the path, and assume that every sender plays in accordance with the initial equilibrium for any other history, this must also be an equilibrium. All senders get exactly the same payoff as in the initial equilibrium, and any sender who would have an incentive to deviate in the one step profile would have an incentive to deviate under the initial profile as well.
Given a one step equilibrium, the equilibrium path is a distribution of beliefs with the property that no sender has an incentive to refine any belief in the support of this distribution. That is, any belief in the support of the equilibrium must be stable. We also know that the distribution has finite support without loss of generality, and, since the state space is finite, the convex hull of the beliefs in the equilibrium distribution is finite dimensional. A failure of uniqueness would imply that there are multiple convex combinations over the finite support of stationary beliefs that give some sender the same utility. But, by Carathéodory's theorem, every point in the convex hull can be spanned by M + 1 vertices of the convex hull, where M is the dimensionality of the set. Hence, if there are more than M + 1 vertices of the convex hull at least one can be spanned by the others. Indifference requires that a sender gets the same utility if moving for sure to the vector that is spanned by the others as if getting a lottery with probabilities defined by the spanning weights over the spanning vector. Such indifference holds for utility functions of measure zero. Repeating the argument for all possible combinations of vertices and all senders we have a finite set of possibilities for indifference, and it follows that equilibria are essentially unique for almost all sender payoff functions.
Converting the problem to a problem over a finite set of vertices is also helpful computationally. To illustrate this we consider a simple example with three states and three actions where, because we can restrict attention to equilibria on a few vertices, it is very simple to find the equilibrium. The example is also of some interest because the unique equilibrium is fully revealing despite both senders being better off providing no information at all, so there is a flavor of a prisoner's dilemma. Despite its simplicity, the example suggests that one may be able to use the methodology of our paper to find interesting classes of "opposing" preferences where full revelation is the only equilibrium.
Moving on to comparative statics, we ask what happens if the number of senders is increased. We know from Li and Norman (2017) that this can result in a loss of information if an extra sender is added at the end or in the middle of the order. In contrast, if an additional sender is added at the root of the game we show that such loss is impossible. Either, the new (essentially unique) equilibrium is more informative in Blackwell's order or the two equilibria cannot be compared. While it is unfortunate that one may not always be able to rank equilibria by informativeness, this is a consequence of the incompleteness of the Blackwell ordering that simply cannot be avoided. We also demonstrate that sequential persuasion results in equilib-ria that are no more informative than simultaneous persuasion. That is, either the equilibria cannot be compared or simultaneous persuasion is more informative in Blackwell's order.
Our paper relates to a large body of work on information disclosure, but is most directly connected with the growing literature on Bayesian persuasion started by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and Rayo and Segal (2010) . This literature has recently been extended to incorporate multiple senders (see Kamenica (2016, 2017) as well as Au and Kawai (2015) , and Hoffmann, Inderst, and Ottaviani (2014) ), but none of these papers deal with sequential moves by the senders. There is also a growing body of work embeds persuasion into dynamic models (see Ely, Frankel, and Kamenica (2015) and Ely (2017) ), but the paper that is closest in spirit to ours is Board and Lu (2015) , who incorporate Bayesian persuasion into a search model. 2 However, Board and Lu (2015) consider payoff functions that are more restrictive than in this paper, and the decision maker faces an optimal stopping problem. In contrast, the decision maker has no influence on the precision of her information in our model. The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. In section 2, we describe the model setup.
Section 3 characterize the set of equilibria. We show that a Markov perfect equilibrium exists and that the equilibrium outcome is generically unique, and also illustrate that our characterization is helpful for computing equilibria within a simple example. In section 4, we perform some comparative static.
Model

The Environment
Consider an environment with n ≥ 1 senders and one decision maker. Each sender i ∈ {1, ..., n} has payoff function u i : A ×Ω → R where a ∈ A is the action taken by the decision maker and ω ∈ Ω is the state of the world, where both A and Ω are finite. The decision maker has a payoff function u D : A × Ω → R and there is a common prior belief given by µ 0 ∈ ∆ (Ω) . Payoff functions are common knowledge and players evaluate lotteries using expected utilities. Fix a belief µ and an action a, define player i 's expected payoff as
2 Glazer and Rubinstein (2001) studies a finite horizon sequential persuasion model, but they consider a very different information structure. There are also papers in the cheap talk and disclosure literature that asks what the implications of multiple senders are. See Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) , Battaglini (2002) , Kawai (2015) , Krishna and Morgan (2001), Kartik, Lee, and Suen (2017, 2016) , Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) .
for i = 1, ..., n, D. In order to avoid "flats" in the decision maker's problem we make a mild regularity assumption that guarantees that for every pair of actions there is some state that makes the decision maker strictly better off by taking the first action than the second and another state that reverses the rank of the payoffs. This assumes away actions that are strictly dominated for the decision maker, and also the possibility that the decision maker is indifferent between two actions regardless of beliefs.
Assumption 1. For each ordered pair of actions a, a there exists a state ω ∈ Ω such that u D (a, ω) > u D a , ω .
The reason we make this assumption is that it implies that the set of beliefs making the decision maker indifferent between any two actions, the set {µ ∈ ∆(Ω)|v D (a, µ) = v D (a , µ)}, is the intersection between ∆ (Ω) and a lower dimensional hyperplane.
Every player is uninformed about the state of the world, but the senders may provide information to the decision maker by creating signals. As in Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) we formalize signals using the partition representation introduced by McGuire (1959) and Marschak and Miyasawa (1968) . A generic signal is a finite partition of Ω × [0, 1] such that each set in the partition is Lebesgue measurable.
Given signal π we assign probabilities as if a sunspot variable Z is drawn uniformly from 
Denoting the unconditional probability of s by p (s) = ω ∈Ω p s|ω µ 0 ω and noting that s∈π p (s|ω) = 1 for each ω ∈ Ω we note that every signal induces a distribution of posterior beliefs that satisfies the Bayes plausibility constraint s∈π µ (ω|s) p (s) = µ 0 (ω) .
(
We let Π denote the set of admissible signals. Signals are partially ordered as one can partition each set in the partition:
Definition 1. π is a finer partition than π , denoted π π , if for every s ∈ π there exists s ∈ π such that s ⊂ s . See Figure 1 for a simple illustration of the information structure. If s 1 is realized, (ω, Z ) ∈
(ω 0 , [0, 0.7]) or (ω, Z ) ∈ (ω 1 , [0, 0.3]) with equal probability; and thus µ(s 1 ) = 0.3 by (2). Since s 1 = s 2 ∪ s 2 , π 2 is a finer partition than π 1 .
The space (Π, ) is a lattice and we can define the join of two signals as follows: for any two signals π, π , let the π∨π be the signal that consists of realization s ∩ s for each s ∈ π and s ∈ π .
Notice that π ∨ π is finer than both π and π for any pair of signals π, π , which intuitively suggests that combining two signals by taking intersections generates a more informative new signal. Indeed, Green and Stokey (1978) show something more powerful. Given a signal on partition form, let S be any set with the same cardinality as π and represent the signal as the pair S, p where p (·|ω) is defined above. We call this the standard representation of a signal. It then follows:
Lemma 1 (Green and Stokey, 1978) . Consider a signal π and let S, p be associated standard representation. Also, let S , p be any signal that is more informative than S, p in the sense of Blackwell (1953) . Then, π can be further partitioned into some π with standard representation S , p .
That is, not only does a finer partition correspond with a more informative signal in the sense of the less informative being a garbling of the other, but this also says that for anything that is more informative in Blackwell's sense there exists a way to partition the coarser signal into a signal that provides the information of the Blackwell dominating signal. This fact is a central building block in the analysis below.
The Extensive Form
Senders move sequentially with sender 1, ..., n posting signals π 1 ...., π n with each sender i being able to observe all signals that have already been posted when i moves. Then nature draws ω and the sunspot variable. Finally, the decision maker observes (π 1 , ...., π n ) and a joint realization ∩ n i =1 s i with s i ∈ π i for each i ∈ {1, ..., n} and takes an action a ∈ A. Each sender observes previous senders' signals, so player 1 posts a signal following the trivial null-history {h 0 } and the set of admissible histories for sender i ≥ 2 is H i = Π i −1 . A pure strategy for a sender is a map σ i : H i → Π, and, in general, a generic history for the decision maker is a vector (π 1 , .., π n , s) with s = ∩ n i =1 s i and s i ∈ π i for each i . However, we restrict attention to Markov perfect equilibria, meaning that the decision maker's choice only depends on the posterior belief induced by the signals and the realization, so σ D : ∆(Ω) → A. This is in general restrictive, and we have an example in Appendix A where the decision maker can use a non-Markovian decision rule as carrots and sticks, so that a qualitatively different equilibrium can be supported with non-Markov strategies. 4 There is uncertainty about the state, but information is symmetric, and there is therefore never any point in the game where any player needs to update the beliefs about the type of other players. Hence, subgame perfection is applicable, and we will use this equilibrium concept. In addition, the restriction to Markov equilibria is convenient, because the payoff relevant history consists of the implied joint signal that the decision maker would use if there is no further information provided. That is, each history h i = {π j } i −1 j =1 induces a joint signal, π i −1 = ∨ i −1 j =1 π j , and the information that sender i can provide depends only on π i −1 and not on the individual signals.
Moreover, in a Markov perfect equilibrium all future senders and the decision maker condition on the implied joint information structure, so a Markovian strategy is a map σ i : Π → Π with the interpretation that the domain is the set of admissible joint signals created by {1, ..., i − 1} and σ i π i −1 is the joint signal created by taking the intersection of the sets in π i −1 and the sets in the individual signal posted by i .
One convenient feature of this relabeling of the strategic variables is that σ i π i −1 π i −1 , so that any strategy profile (equilibrium or not) generates a monotone sequence of signals on and off the outcome path in the sense that later partitions are always finer. Notice that for each s ∈ π i −1 , one can calculate the hypothetical posterior belief µ(s) according to (2), which can be interpreted as the decision maker's posterior belief if no sender adds any signal in the continuation game and s is realized.
A straightforward implication is that, by making the partition finer, sender i 's signal gener-ates a mean-preserving spread of µ(s). That is, ∀s ∈ π i −1 , it must hold that
where p(s |s) is the conditional distribution over s ∈ π i given s ∈ π i −1 .
One can interpret the example in Figure 1 as a two-sender sequential persuasion game.
Sender 1's signal π 1 partitions the interval [0, 1] into two parts: s 1 , s 1 in each state. Sender 2 observes the partition and further partitions s 1 into s 2 and s 2 . The decision maker observes the final partition, which is π 2 , and one of its realization s ∈ π 2 , forming a posterior belief µ(s) according to (2).
Results
Existence of Equilibria
The model is a game of perfect information, so equilibria can be computed by backwards induction. However, each player has an infinite action space, so off-the-shelve existence results don't apply. Moreover, the payoffs of senders as a function of posterior beliefs are generically discontinuous at points of indifference for the decision maker. Since there is no reason for different senders to agree on how ties should be broken, it appears that existence cannot be guaranteed. 5 However, we are able to demonstrate that equilibria exist, even if we restrict attention to Markovian strategies: Theorem 1. There exists a Markov perfect equilibrium.
The proof combines results from convex analysis, linear programming, and the Zermelo-Kuhn backwards induction algorithm. By Assumption 1, we can characterize an optimal choice rule for the decision maker in terms of "decision areas" that are convex polytopes. That is, pick any distinct pair a, a ∈ A and define the upper half-space of posterior beliefs such that the decision maker weakly prefers a to a as
It follows that the set of beliefs such that a ∈ A is optimal is given by
We note that {M (a)} a∈A is almost a partitioning of the belief space. That is, ∪ a∈A M (a) = ∆ (Ω) and for any µ in the interior of some M (a) there is no M a such that µ ∈ M a . However, the boundary points of M (a) are points where there exists some a = a such that µ ∈ M (a)∩ M a . . 6 See Figure 2 for a simple example.
Next, we consider the last sender's best response. In any equilibrium, ties must be broken in favor of sender n when the decision maker takes an action. Hence, we consider a decision
and v n (a, µ) ≥ v n a , µ for each a = a. Also, let π n−1 = ∨ n−1 j =1 π j be the joint signal from combining the signals of senders 1, ..., n − 1 and let τ n−1 be the corresponding distribution of posteriors beliefs whose support is denoted by Supp(τ n−1 ).
By adopting the argument in Proposition 1 of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) to incorporate a distribution of possible "prior" beliefs, the best response problem for sender n can be expressed in terms of choosing conditional distributions of beliefs that satisfy Bayes plausibility. 7 This is a linear programming problem that can be written as
where τ(µ |µ) is a (conditional) distribution of posterior beliefs the decision maker faces if the realization s n−1 ∈ π n−1 would generate belief µ provided that n doesn't provide any extra information. But, (7) can be solved by solving one linear program for each belief in the support of τ n−1 . Each such program is on the form,
where it is important to remember that σ D (·) breaks all ties in favor of sender n. For each pro-
M (a 4 )
gram on form (8), consider a restricted finite linear program
j =1 is the set of all vertices that defines the optimal actions for the decision maker, which is finite because both Ω and A are finite. Hence, the linear program in (9) is well defined as it is a finite dimensional bounded linear program.
Lemma 2. For each µ ∈ ∆ (Ω) the linear program (8) is well defined. Moreover:
2. Every solution to (9) given belief µ also solves (8);
3. For every solution τ n ∈ ∆ (∆ (Ω)) to (8) there exists some τ n ∈ ∆ (X ) that solves (9) that generates the same probability distribution over A × Ω.
A detailed proof is in Appendix B. The idea is that each M (a) is spanned by its vertices.
Hence it is possible for the sender to replace some belief µ that is not one of the vertices with a convex combination over the vertices. There are then two possibilities. The first is that the action σ D µ is taken on all the vertices in the convex combination. In this case, the sender is indifferent between µ for sure and the convex combination over the vertices of M (a) . The second possibility is that a different action is taken on one or more of the vertices. Then, the sender may be strictly better off by using the convex combination. Hence, problem (9) generates a utility at least as great as (8). But, the feasible set in (9) is a subset of the feasible set in (8), so the two problems must have the same value. See Figure 2 for a simple example. In the example, µ is in the interior of M (a 2 ) and is induced by one of the solution to problem (8) with probability τ. There must be another solution in which {µ
We can now complete the proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. By Lemma 2, for any µ there exists an optimal solution to program (8) 
as a Markovian best reply by sender n which is defined as the solution to problem (9) for a given µ. Define
which is finite and a subset of X . That is, for each µ ∈ X n , sender n finds it weakly optimal to "split" it into beliefs in X n satisfying Bayes plausibility.
Using the same argument as when breaking up (7) into separate problems for each µ, we can then find the best reply for sender n − 1 by solving the linear program
where τ * n (µ |µ ) µ ∈X n is the conditional probability measure defined by the best response of sender n. But, then for each µ ∈ X n the probability that it is eventually realized is µ τ * n (µ |µ )τ(µ ). Hence, if µ ∉ X n sender n − 1 knows exactly how these beliefs will be "split" over X n is equilibrium. There, replacing µ with the distribution over X n that n will respond with and leaving everything else the same gives n − 1 the same payoff. Hence, we may without loss consider the problem for sender n − 1 a finite dimensional bounded linear program where n − 1 optimizes over τ ∈ ∆ (X n ). This problem has a solution. Fixing an optimal solution for n − 1 we can make the same argument for senders n − 2, ..., 1. It is straitforward to construct senders' equilibrium
Hence, existence of an equilibrium has been proved.
As a byproduct of our existence argument we note that it is irrelevant whether sender i can observe a joint realization s i −1 ∈ π i −1 or not.
Corollary 1. Let (σ 1 , ..., σ n , σ D ) be a Markov perfect equilibrium. Then it is also an equilibrium of the game where nature draws the state ω and the sunspot variable Z at the root of the game and where each sender observes all predecessors' signal realizations in addition to the signals.
This follows since every best response problem can be broken into a number of problems, one for each belief in the support of the distribution generated by the joint signals of previous senders. This is how we justified using (8) instead of (7), (10) instead of the analogue to (7) for sender n − 1 and so on. This, in turn came from using a signal structure where a joint signal realization is an intersection of individual realizations, which is why for each s i −1 ∈ π i −1 we may let π i s i −1 define a contingent partition of s i −1 and note that the state dependent probability
Hence, the only difference between observing the realized outcome of π i −1 and not is that player i conditions on s i −1 when it is observed and takes expectations over s i −1 when it is not observed. But, this is irrelevant as the way player i maximizes the expected payoff is to maximize each component in the sum.
We further note that if senders observe the signal and the realization before adding more information it is irrelevant whether signals are represented as partitions of Ω × [0, 1] or as "plain vanilla" independent noisy signals. This implies that, if all senders move in sequence, we can interpret the assumption that signals may be arbitrarily correlated as saying that experiments are conducted sequentially with experimental results revealed in each stage.
In Board and Lu (2015) results depend critically on whether signal realizations are observable to competitors and they refer to this as a distinction between public and private persuasion. In this language, our sequential model with coordinated signals can thus be thought as a representation of a public persuasion model.
Corollary 1 also buys us the equivalence between the partition and belief representations of information systems that is central to the analysis in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) . Because each sender can condition on any s i −1 ∈ π i −1 the problem for sender i is solved by solving π i −1 separate problems, each of them with the same qualitative features as a single sender persuasion model. One can therefore characterize each sender's equilibrium signal choice by using the convexification approach used in Aumann and Maschler (1968) and Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) : senders make realization contingent choices, allowing sender i to split the interim belief µ(s i −1 ) in an arbitrary way for every s i −1 ∈ π i −1 . This fact was used repeatedly in our existence argument.
Simplifying the Problem
An interesting feature of the sequential structure is that we can always focus on equilibria where the first mover immediately implements the equilibrium information structure:
In a one step equilibrium the information structure facing the decision maker is chosen by the first sender, and, on the equilibrium path, senders add redundant or no information at all.
Lemma 3. Every Markov perfect equilibrium has a one step Markov perfect equilibrium that
generates the same joint distribution over Ω × ∆ (Ω).
Proof. Fix a Markov perfect equilibrium (σ, σ D ) and let π * 1 = σ 1 (h 0 ) and π * i = σ i π * i −1 for each i ∈ {2, .., n} so that the equilibrium path signals are π * 1 , ...., π * n . Consider the alternative strategy profile ( σ, σ D ) where σ 1 (h 0 ) = π * n and σ i (π) = π * n if π = π * n σ i (π) if π = π * n for i = 2, ..., n and σ D (π) = σ D (π) for each π ∈ Π. We note that the implied payoffs for all players are the same if playing ( σ, σ D ) as when playing (σ, σ D ) . Also, there is no change in the strategy used by the decision maker or the off-the equilibrium path strategies used by the senders, so ( σ, σ D ) is an equilibrium if and only if we can show that there is no deviation on the equilibrium path. Suppose such a deviation exists, so that playing π is strictly better than π * n for some sender i ∈ {1, ..., n} . But, for each sender i ∈ {2, ..., n} we have that π * n is a finer partition than π * i , so π is a feasible deviation in the original equilibrium. Since continuation play following π is the same under (σ, σ D ) it must be that π is a profitable deviation from σ i for some i which contradicts with that (σ, σ D ) is a (even a Nash) equilibrium. Finally, sender 1 has no constraints on what signals to play, so if sender 1 has a profitable deviation from π * n there is a profitable deviation from σ 1 (h 0 ), again contradicting (σ, σ D ) being an equilibrium.
The proof of Lemma 3 is similar to the proof of revelation principle, but with a trivial type space. Given that π * n is the implied outcome in (a potentially complicated) equilibrium the senders may as well agree on it immediately, as no sender has an incentive to further refine the information.
Notice that we are interested in one-step equilibria because it is a convenient tool to characterize equilibrium outcomes. It is possible that the first sender would be strictly better off at some strictly less informative signal, in which case it may be more reasonable to assume that the first sender would add less information in the hope of a small chance that the senders that follow make mistakes and don't further refine the signal. Indeed, the one-step equilibrium could be asking sender 1 to play a weakly dominated strategy. However, this is irrelevant for the set of equilibrium outcomes.
Definition 3. Two strategy profiles are outcome equivalent if they generate an identical joint
The reason why this is in important concept is that it is (generically) possible that there exists a continuum of equilibria in terms of information structures, but where, because all players only care about distributions over Ω × A, everyone is indifferent across the equilibria. Some of these equilibria are Blackwell comparable, but since no player have strict preferences we treat them as equivalent outcomes.
We note that if we only care about the distribution over Ω × A, then we may as well focus on equilibria with support of the vertices spanning the optimal decisions for the decision maker.
Corollary 2. For generic sender n preferences, every Markov perfect equilibrium has an outcome equivalent one step Markov perfect equilibrium where the posterior beliefs have support on X .
The proof is in the appendix, but the idea is simple. In each "decision area", a player's expected utility is linear in µ. Therefore, one can always modify the equilibrium signal so that every interior posterior belief induced by an equilibrium is replicated by a number of vertex posterior beliefs in X according to the Bayes plausible condition.
The genericity requirement in Corollary 2 rules out utility functions where the decision maker and sender n are both indifferent between some action pairs a and a at µ = M (a) ∩ M (a ). The reason for this is that the Markov assumption forces us to assume that the decision maker makes the same decision at each vertex regardless of the history. If there are two adjacent "decision areas" with distinct actions an equilibrium with an interior belief in one of them (which requires indifference by sender n at any shared vertex, which is non-generic) cannot be replicated by beliefs on the vertex.
Corollary 2 implies that, to predict equilibrium decision making, it is without loss to focus on equilibria inducing beliefs in X . 8 Additionally, we can apply similar arguments off the equilibrium path to further characterize equilibrium signals. That is, when we consider deviations it is without loss of generality to consider one step continuation strategies with support on X :
Definition 4. A signal π i is a one step deviation for sender i from π * if there exist continuation equilibrium strategies (σ i +1 , ..., σ n ) such that σ j (π i ) = π i for each j > i .
Corollary 3. For generic sender n preferences, signal π * supports a one step Markov perfect equilibrium if and only if no sender i has a profitable one step deviation π i ∈ ∆(X ) from π * .
The proof is similar to the proof of Corollary 2, but the logic is slightly different as we are considering conditions under which and equilibrium is immune from deviations rather than replicating an equilibrium, so it is in the appendix for completeness. The genericity requirement is the same as for Corollary 2 and the reason it is needed is the same. An alternative would be to drop the Markov restriction for the decision maker.
Corollary 2 and 3 dramatically simplify the process of finding an equilibrium belief system.
Corollary 2 implies that one can focus on a distribution of stable vertex beliefs, which therefore must have finite support. Corollary 3 implies that we may without loss look for profitable one step deviations with support on X , so corresponding to each candidate stable vertex belief µ ∈ X , there are finitely many admissible deviations.
Essential Uniqueness
In this section, we prove that all Markov perfect equilibria are outcome equivalent in the generic case. That is, the equilibrium distribution over A × Ω is unique.
Definition 5. An equilibrium is essentially unique if all equilibria are outcome equivalent.
Definition 6. Given some µ ∈ ∆ (Ω) we say that a set of spanning vectors Y is minimal if there is
When the spanning vectors are not minimal, one can always replace some of the "redundant" vectors with a convex combination of other vectors, which obviously makes the expression non-unique. See Figure 3 for an example. Theorem 2. Fix any µ 0 . Then there is an essentially unique equilibrium that induces distribution τ over a minimal set of spanning vectors X µ 0 for any fixed preferences of the decision maker and almost all sender preferences.
The proof of Theorem 2 combines three main ideas. The first is that we may as well consider one step equilibria as long as we are only concerned about equilibrium outcomes. The second is that it is rare that players are indifferent between a belief and a "relevant" mean preserving spread, and the third that it is rare to be indifferent between two "relevant" mean preserving spreads.
If there is a failure of essential uniqueness there are two possibilities. The first possibility is that there is some belief in the support of an equilibrium that allows for multiple continuation equilibria in terms of the distribution over actions and states, and the second is that the first sender is indifferent between two distributions that both induce unique continuation equilibria.
If there are multiple continuation equilibria for some belief, some sender is indifferent between not to add any extra information and some mean preserving spread. But, the mean preserving spread can without loss be restricted to the finite set X and if there is an indifference between sticking with the equilibrium belief and the mean preserving spread there are two cases to consider.
The first is that each belief in the mean preserving spread induces the same action as providing no additional information. Any such mean preserving spread gives the same utility to all players, but it does not violate essential uniqueness because the distribution over A × Ω is unchanged. The second possibility is that there are distinct actions after the mean preserving spread, but then indifference is only possible for a lower dimensional subset of preferences. This is because an indifference implies an indifference between no additional information and a mean preserving spread over a minimal set of spanning vectors. Each minimal set of spanning vectors defines a unique mean preserving spread and for each of these there is a lower dimensional set of preferences consistent with indifference. There is a finite set of possible minimal spanning vectors, so by adding up a finite set of measure zero possibilities we get a measure zero possibility.
The final possibility to rule out is that the first sender would be indifferent between two distributions over stable beliefs with unique continuation equilibria. Again, we can restrict attention to minimal spanning vectors as indifference requires indifference between at least two such vectors. For any pair, the possibility is non-generic, and the Theorem follows since there are finite sets of pairs to consider.
We now provide a detailed proof of Theorem 2. First, we need a few intermediate results.
This definition hides the recursive nature of the notion of a stable belief by appealing to the one step equilibrium. This is because in a one step equilibrium, beliefs must be immune to any Bayes plausible deviation by sender n. This restriction defines a subset of ∆ (Ω) of candidate stable beliefs, which we may call S n . The set S n corresponds to what would be the stable beliefs in the continuation game in which n is the only sender. Next, if S i are the stable beliefs in the continuation game where sender i , i + 1, ...., n move sequentially in the same order as in the full game, then stability requires that every µ ∈ S i is in the support of a one step equilibrium of this continuation game. By continuing the argument inductively we obtain a sequence of beliefs that gets (weakly) smaller in every step and the set of stable beliefs is given by the final set in the sequence, S 1 . By construction, this recursive process corresponds with beliefs consistent with a one step equilibrium. Obviously, vertex points of ∆(Ω) belong to S 1 , so the set of stable beliefs is non-empty.
We then have that: Proof. Every equilibrium is equivalent to a one step equilibrium by Lemma 3. Since no sender can further refine each signal in its support the distribution must be over stable beliefs, and sender 1 will obviously pick the distribution optimally.
Recall that there is a finite set of vertices in X that correspond to vertex beliefs that define the optimal choices for the decision maker. From Corollaries 2 and 3 we know that it is without loss to consider continuation equilibria where the induced distribution of beliefs is over X only, so we now define X S i = X ∩ S i as the "vertex-beliefs" that are stable in the continuation game with players j = {i , ..., n} moving in the same order as in the full game. Since X S i always contains the edges of the simplex ∆ (Ω), it is non-empty and of the same dimensionality as ∆ (Ω) . Moreover, the more senders there are, the more restrictions does stability impose, so X S i ⊂ X S i +1 for each i < n. Also, note that X S = X S 1 .
Substituting the equilibrium decision rule σ D (·) into (1) we definê
Lemma 5. For any µ ∈ X S , any i = 1, 2, ..., n, and any non-empty set Y ⊂ X S i \ µ either:
for every τ such that µ ∈Y \ µ τ µ = µ and a set of (bounded) sender i utility functions with Lebesgue measure 1.
The idea is that if some sender i has a weak incentive to split a stable belief µ into a distribution over X S i \ µ then it must be that
for some sender i and some τ that satisfies Bayes plausibility. If the action is the same for each µ ∈ X S i the equality (12) always holds, but then it is also the case that moving probability from µ to X S i \{µ} is irrelevant for the joint distribution over actions and states, so one may as well split beliefs over a minimal set of spanning vectors.
The more interesting case is when X S i contains beliefs that result in at least two distinct actions. Since X S i must contain the vertices of ∆ (Ω) the dimensionality of the convex hull of X S i \{µ} must be the same as the dimensionality of the state space. It follows from Carathéodory's theorem that µ can be spanned by |Ω| vectors in X S i \{µ}. Depending on whether µ is in the interior of CO X S i \ µ or on the boundary a set of |Ω| spanning vectors may or may not be linearly dependent. However, if there are linear dependencies we can eliminate vectors until we get µ spanned by a set of linearly independent vectors in X S i \ µ .
In order for sender i to be indifferent between µ and some distribution over X S i \ µ there must be (this is by linearity in probabilities) some minimal spanning vector for µ that creates indifference. But, provided that there are at least two distinct actions, the indifference condition for any particular minimal spanning vector is satisfied with probability zero as the indifference condition defines a lower dimensional subspace of (bounded) utility functions. Since there is a finite number of possible minimal spanning vectors and a finite number of senders the result follows by induction. See Appendix B for details.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 3, fixing any prior µ 0 ∈ ∆ (Ω) sender 1 has a choice over distributions over X S 1 = X S that are Bayes plausible. By Lemma 5 it follows that for generic preferences once sender 1 has chosen a distribution over X S , then either the essentially unique continuation equilibrium for a belief in the support is to not add any information or beliefs can be split in a way so that the action is unchanged, which results in an unchanged joint distribution over A ×Ω. Hence, any choice by sender 1 results in an essentially unique continuation equilibrium.
Consequently, if essential uniqueness fails sender 1 is indifferent over two Bayes plausible distributions where there are at least two distinct actions taken. But, if two Bayes plausible distributions over X S generates the same expected payoff for 1, then there exists minimal spanning vectors X µ 0 and X µ 0 and (relative to the set of spanning vectors) unique Bayes plausible distributions τ (for X µ 0 ) and τ (for X µ 0 ) such that
which, provided that at least two distinct actions are played by the decision maker, can only hold for a set of (bounded) utility functions of measure zero because the supports of X µ 0 and X µ 0 are minimal. Since there is a finite set of vectors in X S , there is a finite set of potential equalities over minimal spanning vectors to rule out, so the result follows.
Our final characterization result says that if prior µ 0 generates an essentially unique equilibrium with minimal support X µ 0 (which is generically true), then the essentially unique equilibrium given a prior µ 0 in the convex hull of X µ 0 is the unique Bayes plausible distribution over X µ 0 given prior µ 0 . The result shows that the equilibrium is robust with respect to perturbations of prior beliefs that are in the interior of X µ 0 .
Proposition 1. Suppose that the essentially unique equilibrium given prior µ 0 is distribution τ over (minimal) support X µ 0 . Then, for every µ 0 ∈CO X µ 0 every equilibrium outcome is outcome equivalent with the unique Bayesian plausible belief distribution λ over X µ 0 for prior µ 0 .
Proof. Let X µ 0 be the support for the unique equilibrium given prior µ 0 and let τ be the associated equilibrium distribution. For contradiction, assume that there exists µ 0 ∈CO X µ 0 such that an equilibrium distribution τ exists with support X µ 0 = X µ 0 . The argument is identical if µ 0 is a boundary point (it would just be restricted to a subspace) so we assume without loss of generality that µ 0 is an interior point in CO X µ 0 . We note that τ and λ are unique vectors so that
Hence, for any β
and all coeffcients are positive if β is small enough. Also, we assume that τ has support on
This implies that when the prior is µ 0 it is feasible to split beliefs over X µ 0 ∪ X µ 0 in accordance to τ µ − βλ µ + β τ µ µ∈X (µ0)∪X ( µ 0) provided that β small enough. But, since τ is the generically unique equilibrium given mu 0 , this is suboptimal so
which contradicts that τ is better than λ for prior belief µ 0 .
An Application
Besides allowing us to prove existence and essential uniqueness, the characterization of equilibria in terms of stable beliefs provides a simple method for finding equilibria in examples.
Algorithm 1. For each sequential persuasion game where both |Ω| and |A| are finite, one can find the essential unique equilibrium outcome by following the procedure below:
1. Use the the payoff functions of the decision maker and sender n to find M (a), ∀a ∈ A.
2. Find the finite set of vertex beliefs X of {M (a)} a∈A .
3. Repeat the following procedure for i = n, n −1, ....1 to find X S i : define X S i as a subset of X S i +1
where X = X S n+1 .
4. For each prior belief µ 0 , find the minimal spanning vectors on X (µ 0 ) ⊂ X S 1 and a distribu-
5. Construct the corresponding one step equilibrium signal π * from τ. 9
To illustrate this, consider an example with state space Ω = {ω 0 , ω 1 , ω 2 } and actions A = {a 0 , a 1 , a 2 } . We may interpret the states as a defendant being innocent, guilty if a misdemeanor, and guilty of a felony, respectively, and the actions as being sentenced in accordance to the true state of the world. In that case it is reasonable to assume that a judge would have strict preference order a 0 a 1 a 2 in state ω 0 , a 2 a 1 a 0 in state ω 2 , and that a 1 is the preferred action in state ω 1 . For concreteness we assume that the decision maker (judge) has preferences represented by
(1, 0, 0) (0, 1, 0) (0.5, 0.5, 0) Assume that sender 1 (a prosecutor) and sender 2 (a defense attorney) only care about "winning", so that their preferences are state independent. For α > 0 and β > 0 we assume that the payoffs are
implying that the prosecutor prefers a guilty conviction to a misdemeanor to acquittal and that the defense attorney has the opposite preferences.
The beliefs that make each action optimal for the decision maker are depicted in Figure 4 .
That is, a 0 is optimal for the decision in the convex hull of (1, 0, 0) , (0.5, 0.5, 0) , (0.5, 0, 0.5) , a 1 is optimal in the convex hull of (0, 1, 0) , (0.5, 0.5, 0) , (0, 0.5, 0.5) , and a 2 is optimal in the convex hull of (0, 0, 1) , (0.5, 0, 0.5) , (0, 0.5, 0.5) . Hence, the set of vertices spanning M (a 0 ) , M (a 1 ) , and M (a 2 )
consists of the vertices of the simplex together with (0.5, 0.5, 0), (0.5, 0, 0.5), and (0, 0.5, 0.5). Since every equilibrium is observationally equivalent to one with support on X only it follows that:
1. If (0.5, 0.5, 0) is a stable belief then the decision maker must brake the tie in favor of the defense. Hence, the decision is a 0 . But, then the prosecutor has an incentive to split the beliefs to (1, 0, 0) and (0, 1, 0) .
2. Symmetrically, if (0.5, 0, 0.5) is a stable belief the decision maker brakes the tie in favor of the defense, meaning that the decision again is a 0 . But, then splitting beliefs to (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) is a profitable deviation for the prosecutor.
3. If (0, 0.5, 0.5) is a stable belief the decision maker again brakes the tie in favor of the defense, which in this case results in decision a 1 . The prosecutor is better off splitting beliefs to (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1) .
The conclusion is that full revelation is the unique equilibrium outcome for any prior belief µ 0 . 10 Hence, if the probability distribution is 1 3 , 1 3 , 1 3 expected payoffs are 1 3 (α − 1) and 1 3 β − 1 for the defense and the prosecution. For α < 1 and β < 1 this is strictly worse than providing no information (results in misdemeanor conviction for sure), so the example shows that there is a flavor of a prisoners dilemma in the model provided that both senders are purely "career motivated".
Comparative Statics
In our model, there may be multiple equilibrium belief systems that can be ranked according to the Blackwell order, but where the difference in informativeness is irrelevant because all equilibria induce the same joint distribution over A × Ω. We therefore treat π and π as essentially equivalent in terms of the information content provided that they are outcome equivalent:
Definition 8 (Essential Blackwell Order). We say that π is essentially less informative than π if the finest signal that is outcome equivalent to π is less informative than the finest signal that is outcome equivalent to π in the Blackwell order In the rest of this section, we adopt the essential Blackwell order to study two comparative statics exercises.
Adding Additional Experts
Consider a generic sequential persuasion game with n senders where, we add sender i = 0 who moves before sender 1, while everything else is unchanged. Using the one step equilibrium characterization we can show: Proposition 2. Consider the generic case with an essentially unique equilibrium. Then, if a sender is added who moves before all other senders, there exists no equilibrium in the new game that is essentially less informative than the equilibrium in the original game.
Proof. Suppose not. Let X n µ 0 be the set of spanning vectors of an essentially unique equilibrium with n senders that cannot be refined further into a Blackwell dominant outcome equivalent equilibrium. Then:
1. there exist at least one belief µ in the support of the equilibrium with n + 1 senders that can be split into X n µ 0 .
2. there exists no belief µ in the support of the equilibrium with n + 1 senders that is not in the convex hull of X n µ 0 .
But, using Lemma 5 every i ∈ {1, ..., n} is strictly better off to split belief µ into a distribution over X n µ 0 for generic preferences. The proposition follows because we may always restrict attention to one step equilibria.
It is important to remember that the order of moves matter. If an additional sender is placed in any other position than first, the result may fail, as is demonstrated explicitly by an example in Li and Norman (2017) . However, a decision maker that can control what experts to consult could also control the order, and would therefore avoid putting experts that would reduce the information from earlier movers at the end. Hence, if equilibria are unique, then Proposition 2 guarantees that adding senders at the root cannot lead to unambiguously worse information when adding a sender at the root. At worst, the information systems would not be comparable using Blackwell's order.
Simultaneous vs Sequential Persuasion
Finally, we compare the information revealed in our sequential persuasion model with the one in Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016) where senders choose their signals simultaneously. We note that an equilibrium in a simultaneous persuasion game with n senders has the following characterization:
Lemma 6 (Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2016) . Consider a persuasion game with the same structure as our model except that all senders move simultaneously. Assume that τ is the distribution of beliefs in a Markov perfect equilibrium. Then, τ is Bayes plausible given the prior belief µ 0 and for each µ in the support of τ there exists no τ that is Bayes plausible given µ that is preferred to any sender. Hence, the difference between the sequential model and the simultaneous model boils down to a comparison that can be done belief by belief. A belief in the support of an equilibrium of the sequential model must be unimprovable with respect to Bayes plausible deviations over the set of stable beliefs, that is, beliefs that no player would like to further refine. In contrast, a belief in the support of an equilibrium in the simultaneous move game must be unimprovable with respect to any Bayes plausible deviation.
We can then finally conclude that in terms of the distribution over A × Ω it cannot be that the simultaneous move game creates an outcome corresponding to a less informative signal. 11 Proposition 3. Consider the generic case in which the sequential game has an essentially unique equilibrium. Then, there exists no equilibrium in the simultaneous game that is essentially less informative than the equilibrium in the sequential game.
Proof. Consider the generic case and suppose that an equilibrium exists in the simultaneous game that is less informative than an equilibrium in the sequential game that cannot be refined further into a Blackwell dominant outcome equivalent equilibrium. Pick some µ in the support of the simultaneous move equilibrium that is in the interior of CO µ 1 , .., µ M , where µ 1 , .., µ M are beliefs in X S in support of the essentially unique equilibrium in the sequential move model.
Refining µ to the unique Bayes plausible distribution over µ 1 , .., µ M creates a Blackwell dominating information structure and either the decisions on each vector in µ 1 , .., µ M is the same as in µ. Then, splitting beliefs onto µ 1 , .., µ M gives the same distribution over A × Ω as µ, so refining µ to the unique Bayes plausible distribution over µ 1 , .., µ M is also an equilibrium in the simultaneous case. If there are distinct actions then (Lemma 5) generically some sender has a strict incentive to split the beliefs onto µ 1 , .., µ M which by appeal to Proposition 6 implies that that sender has a profitable deviation in the simultaneous move game.
This result is in stark contrast to Glazer and Rubinstein (2001) who, in a related model, find that a sequential debate is more informative that a simultaneous debate. The crucial differences between the models are that the senders in Glazer and Rubinstein (2001) have more constraints on how to generate information than in our model and that the decision maker is allowed to commit. 11 A similar comparison is made in the multi-sender cheap talk literature. The conditions under which a fully revealing equilibrium exists is weaker in a simultaneous-move cheap talk model than a sequential-move one. See Ambrus and Takahashi (2008) , Battaglini (2002) , Kawai (2015) , and Krishna and Morgan (2001) .
Concluding Remarks
We consider a Bayesian persuasion model with multiple senders who move sequentially.
Because it is without loss of generality to focus on equilibria corresponding to a finite set of beliefs we can show that Markov equilibria exist and generate a unique joint distribution over states and outcomes for generic preferences. The fact that a finite set of stable beliefs characterizes the equilibrium is also very convenient computationally. In Section 3.4 we apply this insight on a simple example, where we can easily show that there is a unique equilibrium that is fully revealing despite both senders being better off providing no information at all. The example is simple, but suggests that one may be able to use the methodology of our paper to find interesting classes of preferences where full revelation is the only equilibrium.
A Appendix: Non-Markovian Equilibrium
In this section, we consider an example which has a non-Markovian equilibrium that is qualitatively different from the Markov Equilibrium. Suppose that Ω = {ω 0 , ω 1 } and the optimal choice correspondence for the decision maker is
Also suppose that two senders have state independent preferences
Consider a Markovian equilibrium. Allowing for mixed strategies let σ 1 (0) be the probability for a 1 given belief µ = 0 and σ 4 (1) be the probability of a 4 given belief µ = 1. Suppose that the decision maker has full information. Then, the payoffs are 3 σ 1 (0) + σ 4 (1) 2 for sender 1 3 2 − σ 1 (0) − σ 4 (1) 2 for sender 2, so the payoff is greater than or equal to 3 2 for at least one sender. Hence, beliefs in [0.1, 0.9] can be ruled out in any Markov equilibrium. In contrast, if the decision maker always breaks the tie against the sender who first split the belief into [0, 0.1] or [0.9, 1] each sender may as well not provide any information and qualitatively different equilibria with action a 3 can be supported by such non-Markovian strategies.
B Appendix: Omitted Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Pick any feasible solution τ to program (8). For each a ∈ A write τ a µ for µ such that σ D µ = a so that we may write τ = τ a µ µ ∈ M a a∈A where M (a) = {µ ∈ Ω|σ D (µ) = a} is the "decision area" of action a defined by σ D (·). Obviously, M (a) ⊂ M (a), ∀a.
Since
For every a ∈ A and µ a j spanning M (a) let τ µ a j = µ ∈ M a τ µ λ j so that
Since it is possible that v n a, µ a j < v n a , µ a j for some µ a j ∈ M (a) (and µ a j ∈ M (a), because breaking the tie in favor of a may be better than a) it thus follows that the optimal solution to (9) satisfies
This holds for any feasible solution to (8). Hence, V n µ ≥ V n µ . Moreover, any optimal solution to (9) is a feasible solution to (8), so V n µ ≤ V n µ . This establishes that there exists solutions to (8) and that V n µ = V n µ and that every τ n ∈ ∆ (X ) that solves (9) given belief µ also solves (8). Finally, if τ solves (8) and µ is such that τ n (µ ) > 0 there can be no µ a k ∈ M (a) such that v n a, µ a k < v n a , µ a k and λ k > 0 for the weight on vector µ a k in the convex combination such that µ = J (a) j =1 λ j µ a j . This is seen from noting that this would generate a strict inequality in the first inequality of (13).
B.2 Proof of Corollary 2
By Lemma 3 it is without loss of generality to focus on one step equilibrium. Suppose that there is a one step equilibrium which induces a posterior belief µ ∈ X with positive probability.
Let σ D µ = a be the (unique) optimal action for the decision maker, M (a) be the beliefs where . Suppose there is an equilibrium where µ ∈ (0.5, 1) is induced and therefore action a is played with positive probability. Then (1) σ D (0.5) = a or v n (a, 0.5) > v n (a , 0.5), and (2) µ ∈ (0, 0.5) is not induced in the equilibrium. Otherwise, sender n has a profitable deviation. On the left panel, we show that, if v n (a, 0.5) < v n (a , 0.5), then at µ , sender n has the incentive to deviate by inducing posterior beliefs on 0.5 and a. Notice that we ignore the non-generic case where v n (a, 0.5) = v n (a , 0.5). On the right panel, we show that if µ is induced in equilibrium, sender n has the incentive to deviate by inducing 0 and 0.5.
a is optimal, and X a be the set of vertices of M (a) . Since M (a) is the convex hull spanned by X a there exists λ ∈ ∆(X a ) such that µ = µ a j ∈X a λ j µ a j . Notice that v i (a, µ) = µ a j ∈X a µ j v i (a, µ a j )
for i = 1, 2, ...., n. Recall that at µ a j , the equilibrium decision rule breaks the tie in favor of sender n; therefore, for generic preferences, σ D (µ a j ) = a otherwise there is a profitable deviation of sender n. 12 As a result, one adjusts the equilibrium signal (partition) of sender 1, π * 1 into π * 1 as follows: ∀s ∈ π * 1 inducing µ(s) = µ, further partition s into {s 1 , s 2 , ...s m } where m ≤ |X a | such that µ(s j ) = µ a j . Notice that such adjustment does not affect any player's expected payoff and the equilibrium decision. Repeating a similar procedure for each equilibrium posterior µ ∈ X yields the desired result. See Figure 5 for an intuitive illustration.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Consider any deviation π i for i from π * and let π j = σ j π j −1 for j = {i + 1, ..., n} , so that {π i , ...., π n } is the sequence of joint signals on the path provided that every sender following i fol-lows the original Markov perfect equilibrium strategies. Using the same argument as in Lemma 3, if i deviates directly to π n and senders j = i + 1, ..., n don't provide any more information on the path and follow (σ i +1 , ..., σ n ) off the path this still generates equilibrium play in every subgame following i 's move. Hence, it is without loss to consider profitable one step deviations.
Moreover, suppose the deviation induces a posterior belief µ ∈ X with positive probability. Let σ D µ = a be the (unique) optimal action for the decision maker, M (a) be the beliefs where a is optimal, and X a be the set of vertices of M (a) . Since M (a) is the convex hull spanned by X a there exists λ ∈ ∆(X a ) such that µ = µ a j ∈X a λ j µ a j . Notice that v n (a, µ) = µ a j ∈X a µ j v n (a, µ a j ) ≤ µ a j ∈X a µ j v n (σ * D µ a j , µ a j ) since ties must be broken in favor of sender n in equilibrium. Hence, for generic sender n preferences it must be that there is an equilibrium in which σ D µ a j = a for each µ a j ∈ X a as otherwise sender n would have an incentive to deviate. But then sender i may replace the realization inducing µ with a Bayes plausible distribution inducing preferences over X a ⊂ X .
This can be done for every µ ∉ X , implying that any profitable deviation can be replicated by a profitable one step deviation over X .
B.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. If σ D µ = σ D µ for each µ ∈ X S n there is nothing to prove, but this is a trivil case as the vertices of ∆ (Ω) ⊂ X S n , so the decision is constant for all beliefs. Suppose instead that there exists µ ∈ X S and Y ⊂ X S n and τ ∈ ∆ (Y ) such that µ = µ ∈Y µ τ µ and that (11) is violated for sender n. Thenv n µ = µ ∈Yv n µ τ µ because staying at µ must be weakly preferred to any feasible split of beliefs as otherwise sender n has a strict incentive to split the beliefs, which contradicts that µ ∈ X S n .
Let CO(Y ) be the convex hull of Y and M ≤ |Ω| − 1 be the dimensionality of CO(Y ) . By Carathéodory's theorem it follows that there is a set of M + 1 points µ 1 , ...., µ M +1 from Y such that µ = M +1 i =1 µ i τ i for some τ ∈ ∆ M +1 . Moreover, suppose that the M vectors µ 2 − µ 1 , ...., µ M +1 − µ 1 are linearly dependent. Then there are scalars (α 2 , ..., α M +1 ) = (0, ..., 0) such that
Since there is a finite set of possibilities to span µ using µ 1 , ...., µ M +1 such that µ i ∈ X S n and µ 2 − µ 1 , ...., µ M +1 − µ 1 are linearly dependent and since indifference for a mixture of µ 1 , ...., µ M +1 and µ 1 , ...., µ M +1 is only possible if the sender is indifferent between µ and the convex combination of µ 1 , ...., µ M +1 and µ and the convex combination of µ 1 , ...., µ M +1 we conclude that v n µ > µ ∈Yv n µ τ µ for every Y ⊂ X S n and almost all utility functions of the sender given that at least two distinct actions are taken. Finally, since µ ∈ X S , a finite set, we conclude that the same conclusion holds also over all µ ∈ X S . Next, consider sender i < n and assume that the conclusion holds for each j > i . It is immediate that X S i ⊂ X S i +1 ⊂ .... ⊂ X S n . We can thus repeat exactly the same argument as for sender n to conclude that any failure can occur only for a non-generic set of sender i preferences. The result follows.
